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MEDICAL CARE AND THE
INDEPENDENT MINOR
Early one evening, September, 1967, Dennis Evans, 1 seventeen
years old, was brought into a hospital emergency room with a broken
leg. The hospital immediately attempted to contact his parents for
consent to treat him. However, three months before the accident,
young Dennis had moved away from home to take a job in a neigh-
boring city. His departure was amicable and both of his parents
understood, although his mother was still a little upset. Like a
typical mother, though, she somehow managed to save about fifty
dollars a month from her grocery and household funds to send to
her son. With this and the money he earned as a supermarket clerk,
Dennis managed to support himself, and even had enough left
over to buy a motorcycle, the cause of his accident. The night of
the accident, Dennis' parents had gone to a movie and would not
return home until after midnight. The hospital authorities were
thus unable to locate his parents until hours after the mishap.
What happened to Dennis in the meantime? Almost nothing. His
life was not in immediate danger; he just had a broken bone.
Before January, 1968, few doctors would treat a minor in a
non life-death emergency situation without parental consent.2 Most
physicians justifiably feared that treating a minor would result
in civil liability for battery. The practice with hospitals and physi-
cians, therefore, had been to require parental consent.3
In order to eliminate the burden of obtaining parental consent,
over the past few years California has enacted several statutes
1 A fictitious character.
2 See generally Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912) (a doctor
may always act without parental consent in a life or death emergency situation where
obtaining consent is impracticable).
8 The law regarding the necessity of obtaining parental consent is confusing. In
Bonnet v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. 'Cir. 1941), a doctor was found civilly liable for
performing a skin graft on a fifteen-year-old boy without parental consent. Likewise
in Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920), and in Zoski v. Gaines,
271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935), physicians were held liable for performing tonsilec-
tomies on an eleven-year-old girl and a nine-year-old boy without parental consent.
On the other hand, in Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906), the court
refused to find a doctor civilly liable for removing a tumor from the ear of a seven-
teen-year-old boy. Nor did the court find a doctor liable for performing plastic
surgery on an eighteen-year-old without parental consent in Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio
St. 12, 139 N.W.2d 25 (1956) (per curiam). Also in Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 155
Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1928), the court found a doctor not liable for vaccinating a
seventeen-year-old boy. California courts apparently never reviewed this issue, but
since the possibility of such liability deterred physicians from acting, the practical
result is the same as if liability did exist.
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eliminating the need for parental consent for medical treatment in
certain limited situations. In 1953 unmarried pregnant minors were
empowered to consent to medical care related to their pregnancies."
In 1961 all married minors5 and those on active duty in the armed
services6 were allowed to consent to medical treatment. In 1968
all eighteen-year-olds were given power to consent to give blood
donations. 7 Also, after 1968, minors over the age of twelve were
allowed to consent to treatment for certain communicable diseases.8
However, by far the most radical change in the state of the law
occurred in 1968 when the legislature passed section 34.6 of the
Civil Code, extending the right to consent to medical care to all
minors fifteen or over, living away from home, and managing their
own finances. Doctors may now treat these youngsters without
parental consent and presumably without fear of a suit for battery.
This comment examines that statute, concentrating on the
troublesome areas of the type of minor described, the financial
responsibilities of parent and child and the type of confidential
relationship which exists between the child and the physician.
WHO MAY CONSENT?
Although a bold departure from previous law, section 34.6
is not so broad as to be all-inclusive. It is definitely limited in scope
4 CAL. Civ. CODE .§ 34.5 (West 1954). This statute was also curious in that it
applied only to unmarried pregnant minors. Since married minors could not consent
to medical care until 1961, for three years unmarried pregnant minors could legally
consent while married pregnant minors could not.
5 CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.6 (West Supp. 1970).
6 CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.7 (West Supp. 1970).
7 CAL. CiV. CODE § 25.5 (West Supp. 1970).
8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.7 (West Supp. 1970).
0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 34.6 (West Supp. 1970): "Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, a minor 15 years of age or older who is living separate and apart from
his parents or legal guardian, whether with or without the consent of a parent or
guardian and regardless of the duration of such separate residence, and who is man-
aging his own financial affairs, regardless of the source of his income, may give consent
to hospital care or any X-ray examination, anesthetic, or medical or surgical diagnosis
or treatment to be rendered by a physician and surgeon licensed under the provisions
of the State Medical Practice Act, or to hospital care or any X-ray examination,
anesthetic, dental or surgical diagnosis or treatment to be rendered by a dentist
licensed under the provisions of the Dental Practice Act. Such consent shall not be
subject to disaffirmance because of minority.
"The consent of the parent, parents or legal guardian of such minor shall not be
necessary in order to authorize such hospital, medical, dental, or surgical care and
such parent, parents or legal guardian shall not be liable for any care rendered pur-
suant to this section.
"A physician and surgeon or dentist may, with or without the consent of the
minor patient, advise the parents, parent or legal guardian of such minor of the
treatment given or needed if the physician and surgeon or dentist has reason to know,
on the basis of the information given him by the minor, the whereabouts of the
parents, parent or legal guardian."
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to a specified class of minors. Unfortunately, the group encom-
passed by the code section is not as identifiable as those groups
covered by previous enactments' ° and, indeed, the group's identifi-
cation may prove to be one of the more troublesome aspects of the
statute, especially to the physician who must decide whether or
not to treat the child. Unless the physician has some degree of
certainty about what classes of minors are included in the statute
he may remain hesitant about treating any minor.
Section 34.6 applies to minors: (1) fifteen or older, (2) living
separate and apart from their parents, with or without their con-
sent and regardless of the duration and (3) managing their own
finances, regardless of the source of the income. This description
appears clear. However, close examination reveals the description
to be composed of subjective factors which lend themselves to
numerous interpretations.
First, what does living separate and apart from one's parents
mean? Obviously children like Dennis would be included in the
description. But suppose he were going to college in another city
and living on campus? Theoretically he would be living separate
and apart from his parents. Yet he would probably go "home" for
holidays and for the summer. What if Dennis were just visiting
a friend in another town for the weekend? The statute does specify
that the duration of the separate residence does not matter; so
in a sense he might be living separate and apart from his parents.
The variety of possible situations is innumerable.
A similar phrase, "living separate," appears in section 169 of
the California Civil Code," which deals with property of the wife
acquired while living apart from her husband. Unfortunately, judi-
cial interpretation of the statute provides little help in establishing
any definite guidelines which would be applicable to section 34.6.
In deciding whether a husband and wife were living separate and
apart 2 the courts looked to the intent of the parties to see if they
desired the separation to be final.' However, Civil Code section
10 For example, there is little problem in defining an unmarried pregnant minor.
11 CAL. CIV. CODE § 169 (West 1954).
12 Even though the term "living separate and apart" does not appear in section
169, courts refer to the statute as if it did. See, e.g., Makeig v. United Security Bank &
Trust Co., 112 Cal. App. 138, 296 P. 673 (1931).
13 The most startling case is Makeig v. United Security Bank & Trust Co., 112
Cal. App. 138, 296 P. 673 (1931). Here a married couple lived together for about
seven weeks-six weeks following the marriage and one week three years later. The
husband claimed that they always intended to resume living together permanently
and that the only reason for the separation was to enable them to save money for a
home. The court said that they were not living separate and apart during the fourteen-
year marriage. Also in Tobin v. Galvin, 49 Cal. 34 (1874), a couple were separated
for about a year while the husband lived in Arizona and the wife worked in Los
[Vol. 10
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34.6 expressly specifies that the duration of the separate residence
is not important. Thus a sense of permanency should not govern
here as it does with section 169.
In addition, because section 169 concerns community property,
"living separate" refers to a break-up of the husband-wife relation-
ship. On the other hand, as used in section 34.6 "living separate
and apart" is not primarily concerned with a break-up of the parent-
child relationship but with an actual physical separation, which
sooner or later occurs in almost all parent-child relationships.
Although the interpretations given to section 169 cannot be
strictly adopted, they do provide some guidelines. The intent of
the parties can still be relevant, and, indeed, should be. The physi-
cian and the court should discern whether there is an intent to live
rather than an intent just to visit. Living may be something less
than a "domicile" or "residence,"' 4 yet it should be more than just
visiting a friend.
Many uncertainties also arise from the statutory requirement
that the minor manage his own finances. In a somewhat circular
definition, an Idaho court described "manage" in relation to money
as the power to control, employ or invest it.15 This description
scarcely provides any standards to determine exactly what "man-
age" means. Applying the statute to youngsters such as Dennis,
who have jobs and pay most of their own expenses, presents few
problems. Since that statute specifies that the source of income
does not matter, the money Dennis received from home would not
affect his status under the statute. But what if Dennis' parents sent
a check directly to his landlord to cover his rent? Would he still
be managing his own finances? Or suppose Dennis were a college
student living on campus and his parents paid the school directly
for his room and board. Would it make any difference if his par-
ents sent him the check and he then paid the school for room and
board? To say that the child is managing his finances in the latter
situation but not in the former is an arbitrary distinction.
Angeles. The court said they were not living separate and apart during this time so as
to come under section 169 of the Civil Code.
14 "Courts and legal writers usually distinguish 'domicile' and 'residence,' so
that 'domicile' is the one location with which for legal purposes a person is considered
to have the most settled and permanent connection, the place where he intends to
remain and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, but
which the law may also assign to him constructively; whereas 'residence' connotes
any factual place of abode of some permanency, more than a mere temporary sojourn."
Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 239, 288 P.2d 497, 499 (1955). Perhaps a third category
could be created for "living" which would be something even less permanent than
"residence."
15 Sencerbox v. First Nat'l Bank, 14 Idaho 95,-, 93 P. 369, 371 (1908).
1970]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
In determining whether a child does manage his own finances
the predominant consideration should be day-to-day expenses,
rather than large, one-time expenses which may require little man-
agement ability, especially if the source of the income is one's
parents. Since managing one's finances does not create or strengthen
the need a child would have for medical care without parental con-
sent, in contrast to the provision about living away from home, it
should be a liberally construed provision of the statute.
Objective criteria for determining whether or not a minor is
included within the statutory limits are simply impossible to estab-
lish. The physician must, in the final outcome, use his professional
discretion, which will probably involve a consideration of such
elements as the need for immediate action, the minor's maturity,
the feasibility of obtaining parental consent, the seriousness of the
procedures and any psychological factors which may prevent the
youngster from going to his parents.
Obviously, section 34.6 requires a very subjective determina-
tion by the physician who treats a youngster. Previously, the
doctor had only one requirement in this regard, to ascertain the
age of the person he was treating. Although this may have been
a relatively easy task, the physician may have been strictly liable
if he erred in his determination."6
On the other hand, determining whether a fifteen-year-old is
really living separate and apart from his parents and whether
he manages his own finances is more of a task than discovering
the true age of the child. In the former, the physician will have
the two-fold duty of determining whether or not the child has
told him the truth and then whether or not that qualifies as living
separate and apart and managing his own finances. To impose
strict liability on a physician for this will either require a physician
to fill the role of a private detective and judge, thus diverting much
of his valuable time from his practice, or, more likely, make the
physician hesitant to deal with any minor, thus defeating the very
purpose of the statute.
In a discussion of the nature of the group covered by section
34.6 one more point deserves mention. A physician cannot blindly
treat any fifteen-year-old who meets the requirements of the statute
without first ascertaining that the child sufficiently understands
and appreciates the nature of the treatment which he is to receive.
The statute says that these youngsters may consent to medical care
16 See Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, -, 139 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1956) (concurring
opinion of Hart, J.).
[Vol. 10
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and "such consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance because
of minority."' 7 However, nothing in the statute prevents setting
aside the consent for other purposes, such as lack of understanding
of the nature of the procedure to be undertaken.
The term, "consent," as used herein carries with it the assumption
that previous full disclosure of the implications and probable conse-
quences of the proposed conduct to which such consent applies has
been given in such terms as may be fully comprehended by the person
giving the consent. It necessarily follows that consent requires a reason-
able degree of maturity of mind depending upon the intricacies of the
subject matter to which the consent is applicable.' 8
In one case, the court held that where a woman was under the
influence of an anesthetic and without her glasses she was unable
to understand or appreciate the content of a consent form which
she signed for dental surgery.'9 Just as the consent of an adult
could be set aside because of lack of understanding, so also can the
consent of a minor be set aside for the same reason. Since many
fifteen- or sixteen-year-olds may be incapable of understanding the
nature of certain types of sophisticated medical procedures, the
physician should keep in mind that section 34.6 does not give him
a "green light" where fifteen-year-olds living away from home and
managing their own finances are concerned.
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
To assume financial liability for medical care requires that
one have the ability to enter into a legally binding contract. There-
fore if a minor is to incur liability for services rendered under the
statute, any contractual consent which he might give must not be
subject to disaffirmance.
Generally, a minor's contracts are voidable and subject to dis-
affirmance at his wish.20 However, one major exception has been
codified in California in section 36 of the Civil Code. A minor under
the care of a parent or guardian able to provide for him may not
disaffirm his contracts for necessaries.21 Medical care can be a neces-
sity.2 2 On the other hand, certain types of treatment may not be
considered necessary. Since section 34.6 does not seem to limit the
17 See note 9 supra.
18 Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12,-, 139 N.E.2d 25, 29 (1956).
19 Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. App. 1961).
20 'CAL. CIV. CODE § 34 (West 1954).
21 CAL. Crv. CODE § 36 (West 1954).
22 See Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926).
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type of treatment which can be rendered23 a child might seek some
type of purely cosmetic surgery.
Furthermore, section 36 of the Civil Code also requires that
the minor not be under the care of a parent or guardian able to
support him before he will be liable for contracts for necessaries.
In view of the degree of independence required under section 34.6
the minor seeking medical attention probably will not be under
his parents' care. However, considering the wide variety of situa-
tions encompassed by the statute, some minors are almost certain
to be. For example, a college student, living on a monthly allow-
ance from his parents, might be living separate and apart from his
parents, and might be managing his own finances, but still be con-
sidered to be under the care of parents able to supply him with
necessaries.
Whether or not financial responsibility is imposed by section
34.6 itself will depend on the interpretation given to the phrase
"such consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance." The power to
give contractual consent and the power to give consent to otherwise
tortious acts are not synonymous, nor are they necessarily coex-
istent in the same person. For instance, a child may consent to
certain bodily invasions and his consent may be effective to prevent
a battery.24 At the same time, however, the child may not be able
to enter into a legally binding agreement or contract so as to make
the contract legally enforceable against him.25 Whether the consent
mentioned in section 34.6 refers to consent in the contract or tort
sense, or both, is uncertain. 26 The use of the word "disaffirmance,"
traditionally associated with contracts, may suggest that such is
the intention here. However, "disaffirmance" may be used in other
contexts.2 7 In fact it was used otherwise in section 25.5 of the Civil
Code, which gives eighteen-year-olds the right to consent to donate
blood. Here no real contract issue is involved.' A person does
23 The statute provides for "hospital care or any X-ray examination, anesthetic,
or medical or surgical diagnosis or treatment to be rendered by a physician or surgeon
licensed under the provisions of the State Medical Practice Act, or to hospital care
or any X-ray examination, anesthetic, dental or surgical diagnosis or treatment to be
rendered by a dentist licensed under the provisions of the Dental Practice Act." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 34.6 (West Supp. 1970).
24 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2d § 59 (1965).
25 CAL. CIV. CODE § 34 (West 1954).
26 "It is apparent however that the consent, which prevents what would other-
wise be an assault [sic) from being an assault, does not depend upon the capacity of
the consenting party to contract. It has nothing to do with contractual capacity."
Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, -, 139 N.E.2d 25, 32 (1956) (concurring opinion of
Taft, J.).
27 "DISAFFIRMANCE. The repudiation of a former transaction .... " BLAcK's
LAW DICTIONARY 549 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
28 CAL. Civ. ConE § 25.5 (West Supp. 1970).




not pay a physician to take his blood. But this use of the word "dis-
affirmance" need not be determinative in regard to section 34.6.
In section 25.5 no contract issues exist. Section 34.6, on the other
hand, enters the contract area expressly when it relieves parents
of financial liability for treatment rendered pursuant to the statute.
In addition, section 34.6 is included amongst other statutes defin-
itely related to contractual capacity. Section 34, for example, pro-
vides that "[a] minor may make any other contract than as above
specified in the same manner as an adult, subject only to his power
of disaffirmance under the provision of this Title .... 0
Probably, then, the "consent not subject to disaffirmance" in
section 34.6 does relate to contractual consent, and, therefore, makes
the child financially liable. This is even more likely considering that
if children were not liable the physician would have no one to hold
responsible, parents being expressly exempt.
On the surface, section 34.6 is much clearer in dealing with
parental financial liability, or lack of it. Simply stated, parents
will not be liable for any treatment rendered pursuant to the statute.
Although this apparently marks a considerable change in the law,
it may prove to be a very limited departure from prior law, under
which parents were not only civilly liable to the physician for med-
ical treatment"' but the father was also criminally responsible if he
failed to provide such care. 2
Parental financial liability is abolished only where the treat-
ment is rendered pursuant to section 34.6 and only for that treat-
ment rendered pursuant to it. This presents some possible trouble
areas, which can perhaps best be understood by referring to Dennis'
case. Suppose Dennis had consented to a serious operation after
which he could not work for some months. If he had no other
source of income, the youth would almost certainly turn to his
parents for assistance. While they would not be responsible for the
operation expenses, they would be forced to subsequently assume
the financial burden of supporting him or be liable under sections
196 and 206 of the Civil Code. The father might also be crim-
inally responsible under section 270 of the Penal Code. Conceivably
Dennis might also require extra attention because of his condition.
If Dennis moved back home to recuperate and needed subsequent
treatment his parents might be liable for that, since he would not
be living separate and apart from his parents.33
30 CAL. CIv. CODE § 34 (West 1954).
31 CAL. CIrV. CODE §§ 196, 206 (West 1954).
32 CAL. PEN. CODE § 270 (West 1955).
33 "[The rule requiring parental consent] is not based upon the capacity of a
minor to consent, so far as he is personally concerned, within the field of the law of
torts or law of crimes, but is based upon the right of parents whose liability for sup-
1970]
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Another possible area of trouble regarding parental financial
responsibility arises when physicians treat youngsters who might
qualify to give consent under two different statutes, sections 34.6
and 34.5, the latter dealing with unmarried pregnant minors. Sec-
tion 34.5 says nothing about financial liability. Take for example,
the case of an eighteen-year-old unmarried pregnant college girl,
living at school, who sees a doctor about her pregnancy. If parents
wish to escape financial liability for the visit they could claim that
she consented under section 34.6 because she was living separate
and apart from home and managing her own finances. If such
were the case the parents would be exempt from financial respon-
sibility. On the other hand, if the doctor wanted to look to the
parents for the cost of the treatment he could claim that he treated
her under section 34.5 because she was unmarried, pregnant, and
sought care related to her pregnancy. Since this statute is silent
about the parents' duty to pay, the traditional rule should apply
to render the parents liable.
DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
The third major area of concern with the statute relates to the
confidential relationship between the doctor and the minor patient.
The statute perplexingly states:
A physician may, with or without the consent of the minor patient,
advise the parents ... if the physician ... has reason to know on the
basis of information given him by the minor, the whereabouts of the
parents, parent or legal guardian.
3 4
If the doctor deems it advisable to tell the parents he must then
attempt to trick an unwilling child into giving him enough infor-
mation so that the parents can be found. The statutory qualification,
that the doctor may tell the parents if he has reason to know their
location on the basis of information supplied by the child, seems
absurd since he does not need the consent of the child to tell the
parents.
The absurdity is explained by reviewing the assembly bill as
originally introduced. This version states that a doctor must tell
the parents if he has reason to know their whereabouts on the
basis of information given by the child.3 5 Here the qualification
port and maintenance of their child may be greatly increased by an unfavorable result
from the operational procedures upon the part of a surgeon." Lacey v. Laird, 166
Ohio St. 12, -, 139 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1956) (concurring opinion of Taft, J.).
34 CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.6 (West Supp. 1970).
35 "A physician and surgeon or dentist shall, with or without the consent of the
minor patient, advise the parents, parent or legal guardian of such minor of the treat-
[Vol. 10
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makes sense, since to provide otherwise would impose an unreason-
able burden upon the physician. However, at present, the statute
is uncertain and vague with regard to the rights and obligations
of the minor patient and the physician. What these are or should
be can be clarified by considering the nature of the doctor-patient
relationship in general.
Ordinarily the doctor has the duty to refrain from disclosing
his patient's confidences. To do so may result in civil liability,
usually predicated upon an invasion of privacy" or libel.87 However,
the physician is privileged if he acts in good faith and reports fairly
only to the relevant parties.Ys Some courts also look to whether the
doctor is acting in a public interest.39 California takes a further
step and requires that even to state a cause of action for breach
of this duty, the plaintiff must allege that the doctor acted mali-
ciously in disclosing information.40
As it is the law in California, a physician's disclosure of in-
formation to the parents of his minor patients will seldom, if ever,
result in civil liability. The question, then, is whether the disclosure
provision in section 34.6 imposes an additional duty on the physician
not to tell the parent unless the child provides him with information
by which he can locate the parent or whether it gives the physician
a right, in addition to the other privileges, to make disclosures
under the circumstances described.
As stated above,4 the original bill demanded that the physician
notify the parents. The change from "shall" to "may" must have
been to ease the obligation imposed on the doctor, and to enable
physicians, who so desire, to maintain a confidential relationship
with all minor patients. In light of this, the statute probably does
not destroy the provisions of the prior law. Rather, it simply en-
larges the doctor's rights. If he does notify the parents of the
treatment given to a minor patient pursuant to the statute, the
question of malice never arises, since he has an absolute right to
do so. If he does notify the parents, yet locates them by means of
ment given or needed if the physician and surgeon or dentist has reason to know, on
the basis of the information given him by the minor, the whereabouts of the parents,
parent or legal guardian." CAL. Cir. CODE 34.6 (West Supp. 1970) (emphasis added)
as originally introduced.
36 Griffin v. Medical Soc'y of New York, 7 Misc. 549, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1939).
37 Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
38 Id. at-, 331 P.2d at 819.
39 Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (concerned with
syphilis).
40 See Schwartz v. Thiele, 242 Cal. App. 2d 799, 51 'Cal. Rptr. 767 (1966); Mc-
Pheeters v. Board of Medical Examiners, 103 Cal. App. 297, 284 P. 938 (1930).
41 See note 35 supra.
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collateral sources, then the normal rules of breach of confidence
would apply, making malice a necessary element of a cause of
action.
OBSERVATIONS
California's new law regarding medical consent by a minor
will pose a number of difficulties, especially for the physician. Each
time he deals with a child he will have to interpret the statute and
then determine whether or not that minor meets the stated require-
ments. Ignorance of the type of liability existing for an error in
this determination may weigh heavily upon the doctor.
These problems have undoubtedly resulted from an attempt
by the legislature to meet one specific need only: The need created
by the often difficult and sometimes impossible burden of obtaining
parental consent in order to render medical care to juveniles living
away from home. Unfortunately, however, the legislature addressed
itself to only one limited area of need, that resulting from the phys-
ical separation of parent and child. But for many children still
living at home, there exists a psychological separation from their
parents. Many of the health problems unique to today's youth
reflect that separation. A prime example is the teen drug problem.
While perhaps unfair to state that the youngster started using drugs
because of his parents, to say that he often fails to obtain medical
help because of the gulf is certainly reasonable. He cannot go to a
physician for treatment without consent from his parents and is
probably too frightened to go to them. In today's society this type
of need is becoming all too common.42 In fact the legislature has
to some extent recognized a related problem in section 34.7 of the
Civil Code,43 where it permitted minors twelve or over to consent
to treatment for communicable diseases required to be 'reported
to local health officials, thus allowing minors to consent to treatment
for venereal disease. But where does the legislature proceed? Does
it continue to make laws for each new health problem which arises
among the young? This will, of course, be impracticable. The only
real solution is to give minors the same status as adults in obtaining
medical treatment, at least minors above a certain age, such as
fifteen. This has already been done in one state, Mississippi, by
means of a statute44 which provides that any unemancipated minor
42 See Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967).
43 CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.7 (West Supp. 1970).
44 MIss. CODE ANN. § 7129-81(h) (Supp. 1968): "It is hereby recognized and
established that, in addition to such other persons as may be so authorized and em-
powered, any one (1) of the following persons is authorized and empowered to con-
sent, either orally or otherwise, to any surgical or medical treatment or procedures
[Vol. 10
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of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the conse-
quences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment may con-
sent to such treatment. The arguments supporting such a statute
are augmented by an increasing awareness of medical procedures
at all age levels, particularly among juveniles. This is in part be-
cause we live in an age in which medicine has become more and
more a matter of public interest. The public education systems have
complemented this tendency and have often required Health and
Hygiene courses. To say that a child could not understand and
appreciate many of the dangers inherent in medical practices is not
always true.
However, this would solve only one of the problems with
California's new statute, for the financial problems as well as those
relating to the confidential relationship between patient and doctor
would still remain. Making the child expressly financially liable
may deter youngsters from seeking help, thus defeating the very
purpose of the statute. On the other hand, if children are not held
expressly liable, the physician might be somewhat deterred from
treating minors. This too would serve to defeat the purpose of such
a statute.
Even if the child is held expressly liable for treatment, prob-
lems of collateral financial responsibility remain, that is, liability
for support and maintenance which may arise as an indirect result
of medical procedures secured by the child. To eliminate parental
financial liability in this area would, in its effect, be unreasonable.
It would also open the door for parents to encourage their young-
sters to consent to medical care themselves, thus relieving the par-
ents of any and all responsibilities for their children. On the other
hand, holding parents liable on collateral matters related to medical
treatment to which they did not consent may not be as unfair as it
seems. Section 206 of the Civil Code45 holds children liable for the
support of poor parents. If the parents' need for assistance arose
out of some previous medical treatment, the child could not dis-
claim liability because he was not consulted as to the treatment.
The type of confidential relationship involved also presents
problems. With the physician it is mostly a matter of uncertainty.
After reading the statute he may not be quite certain of its legal
not prohibited by law which may be suggested, recommended, prescribed or directed
by a duly licensed physician:
'1"h. Any unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and ap-
preciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or pro-
cedures, for himself."
45 CAL. Civ. 'CODE § 206 (West 1954).
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meaning. But he is fairly safe in assuming that he will incur no
liability regarding his actions, provided they are devoid of malice.
But the statute presents much more of a problem for the child.
Many times a child leaves home because of various problems with
his parents. If that child cannot see a physician with the security
of knowing that whatever transpires will be solely between the two
of them, he is likely not to go at all. This naturally would defeat
much of the value that such a statute has to offer. Therefore, a
strict duty of confidence should be imposed upon the physician.
CONCLUSION
California's law, in spite of its ambiguities and uncertainties,
does make a definite advance and will allow physicians to act in
situations where action is needed. It does not, however, go far
enough. In order to meet the demands of society and of today's
youth the legislature should enact a statute similar to that of Mis-
sissippi. Furthermore, such a statute should include a provision
holding the minor financially liable for the treatment provided,
as well as a provision imposing the strictest duty of confidence on
the doctor. To insure the performance of this duty parents must be
expressly exempted from financial liability for the care, since phy-
sicians may otherwise bill the parents, thus opening a Pandora's box
of problems.
Joanne I. Banker
